Abstract-We consider a resource allocation game with binary preferences in which each player as a node of an undirected unweighted network is trying to minimize her cost by caching an appropriate resource. Using an ordinal potential function, we propose a polynomial time algorithm to obtain a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when the number of resources is limited or the network has a high edge density with respect to the number of resources. Moreover, we provide an algorithm to approximate any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game over general networks, and extend our results to games with arbitrary cache sizes. Finally, we make a comparison between graph coloring and the Nash equilibrium points.
I. INTRODUCTION
Design and analysis of distributed control algorithms for social networks constitute an important area of research, which has attracted a lot of attention in recent years [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , and have emerged in a variety of disciplines such as economics, computer science, and statistics [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] . In fact, one of the main challenges of studying social networks from a distributed control perspective is modeling the competitive behavior of social entities. In this context, game theory has been proven to be a strong and promising tool for modeling and analyzing competitions across networks [10] , [11] , [12] . Among many problems which study competition over social networks, resource allocation problems or resource allocation games (in the game-theoretic context) are the ones which stand out and have been widely used in the literature.
Typically, resource allocation games are characterized by a set of agents (players) who compete for the same set of resources [13] and have been used to study various problems such as content management [14] , congestion games [15] , [16] , peer-to-peer systems [17] , [18] , and web-caches [19] . In particular, allocation games have emerged widely in economics such as market sharing [20] , where a set of agents want to provide service to their costumers with a limited set of resources while there are different request rates for different resources and providers, and the main challenge here is to determine whether the outcome of interactions between service providers modeled as a repeated game converges to a Nash equilibrium and how long it will take to converge.
In fact, one of advantages of studding allocation problems within the game-theoretic framework is to improve the availability of resources (such as company's products) for the customers and to improve the robustness of the allocation system with respect to network failures [21] , [22] . In general, one can place resource allocation games into two classes: uncapacitated and capacitated. In the uncapacitated resource allocation game, the players do not have any limitation on their cache sizes, but there is a certain cost for holding additional resources in the caches. As an example of an uncapaciteted resource allocation game one can consider [21] , where the authors were able to characterize the set of equilibrium points based on the parameters of the problem. However, when the agents have limited capacity (cache size), the situation is more complicated, as this will bring in additional restrictions on the actions of the players. Unlike the uncapacitated case, there is no nice characterization of the equilibrium points at hand for the capacitated allocation games.
Typically, capacitated allocation games are defined using a set of resources whit each player (service provider) able keep only a limited number of resources in her cache. Moreover, the players can communicate over an undirected communication graph. Such a communication graph identifies the access cost among the players and the goal for each player is to satisfy her customers' needs with minimum cost. Ideally, and in order to avoid any additional cost, each player only wants to provide her own set of resources. However, due to limited capacity, players cannot hold all the resources in their cache, hence they may have to borrow from others some of the resources which are not available in their own caches in order to provide to their customers, and this incurs some cost.
In this paper, we consider a special type of capacitated resource allocation game as was introduced in [19] , where players can only hold a unit size of resources in their caches. In particular, we analyze the binary preference version of such games in which each player is equally interested in all the possible resources. In this model, players will act myopically and selfishly, while they are required to fully satisfy their customers' needs. In other words, although the players act in a selfish manner with respect to others, to satisfy their customers' needs, their actions closely depend on the others' and they do not have absolute freedom in the selection of a resource to hold in their caches.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the capacitated resource allocation game with binary preferences, known as the CSR game and provide an overview of some of its salient properties. In Section III, we develop some preliminary results for later use. Based on these results, we introduce in Section IV an update rule based on least best response dynamics, and show that it can find a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in polynomial time when the number of resources is limited or the underlying graph has a high edge density. In Section V, we provide a quasi-polynomial algorithm for approximating a purestrategy Nash equilibrium in general networks. In Section VI, we extend our results to the capacitated resource allocation game with cache sizes greater than 1. As a result, we show that increasing the players' cache sizes will facilitate the finding of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and we locate the effective nodes and their extra cache sizes by solving a linear program. We conclude the paper in Section VII. Finally, in Appendix I, we sketch some connections between graph coloring and the equilibrium points of the binary resource allocation game.
Notation: We let Z and R denote, respectively, the sets of integer and real numbers. For an integer number n, we let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a vector v ∈ R n , we let v i be the ith entry of v and v be its transpose. We use G = (V, E) for an undirected network with a node set V and an edge set E. For any two nodes i, j ∈ V, we let d G (i, j) be the graphical distance between them, that is, the length of a shortest path which connects i and j. The diameter of the graph, denoted by D, is the maximum distance between any pair of vertices, that is, D = max i,j∈V(G) d G (i, j). Moreover, for an arbitrary node i ∈ V and an integer r ≥ 0 we define a ball of radius r and center i to be the set of all the nodes in the graph G whose graphical distance to the node i is at most r, i.e. B G (i, r) = {j ∈ V|d G (i, j) ≤ r}. We let 1 denote a column vector with all entries equal to 1. Finally, we denote the cardinality of a finite set S by |S|.
II. CAPACITATED RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME WITH BINARY PREFERENCES
In this section we formulate the capacitated resource allocation game with binary preferences as was introduced in [19] , which for simplicity we refer to as the CSR game.
We start with a set of V = {1, 2, . . . , n} nodes (players) which are connected by an undirected unweighted graph G = (V, E). We denote the set of all resources by O = {o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o |O| }. We assume that all resources are of identical size and that each player has a unit size cache. In other words, each player can only hold one resource in its cache (we will relax this condition later in Section VI). Therefore, player i's action, denoted by P i ∈ O, is the allocated resource by node i, and the action set of all the players are identical and equal to O (throughout this paper we interchangeably use the notions of caching and allocating a resource by a player).
Moreover, we let P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) be the allocation profile, i.e., the vector of actions of all the players. For a particular allocation P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ), the cost of the ith player C i (P ) is given by:
where σ i (P, o) is i s nearest node holding o in P . Moreover, if some resource o is missing in an allocation profile P , we define the cost of each player for that specific resource to be large, e.g., d G (i, σ i (P, o)) = n, ∀i. This incentivizes at least one of the players to allocate any missing resource. In the case where n < |O|, all the players will allocate different resources and the game becomes trivial, hence we can simply assume that n ≥ |O|.
In fact, one way of interpreting the costs given in (1) is to consider each player as a service provider who can choose to serve its customer by only one resource. If a customer refers to a player i for a specific resource o, either player i has resource o in its cache, which it can then provide to its customer without any cost, or otherwise, player i has to search the network and borrow resource o from the closest service provider who has that in its cache, in which case player i incurs a cost proportional to the number of hops it has traveled. Therefore, assuming that the players and the customers are equally interested in all the resources, player i has to choose an appropriate (with respect to the choice of other players) resource to hold in its cache in order to minimize its average cost given by (1).
Definition 1: An allocation profile P * is said to be a purestrategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of the CSR game if
where P * −i denotes the cache content of all the players other than the ith player.
It has been shown earlier [19] that CSR games always admit a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Also, it was shown in [19] that when there are only two different resources, i.e. |O| = 2, there exists a polynomial time algorithm O(n 3 ) which converges to a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Moreover, it was shown in [23] that CSR games benefit from having a low price of anarchy, and that an equilibrium can be found in linear time when the network has a tree structure. However, when the number of resources is more than 2, there is no known polynomial time algorithm for finding an NE of the CSR game, and this is what we address in this paper.
One of our goals in this paper is to study the convergence of some particular updating dynamics to NE of the CSR game. Toward that end, we let P i (t) be the action (allocated resource) of player i at some generic time t = 1, 2, . . . (t refers to a step in an algorithm or equilibrium dynamics), and P (t) = (P 1 (t), P 2 (t), . . . , P n (t)) be the allocation profile at that time. We suppress the dependence on time t whenever there is no ambiguity. It is worth noting that we do not consider a repeated CSR game among players, rather, we are devising a distributed algorithm in which at each time step t only one player updates its action (cache content) such that the overall the action profiles P (t), t = 1, 2, . . . converge to an NE of the CSR game. Therefore, in the remainder of this paper we focus on design and analysis of some efficient algorithms for constructing and approximating the equilibrium points of the CSR game.
III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We start this section with the following definition. Definition 2: Given an allocation profile P we define the radius of agent i with respect to profile P , denoted by r i (P ), to be the distance between node i and the nearest node other than her holding the same resource as i, i.e., r i (P ) = min j =i,Pj =Pi d G (i, j). Note that if there does not exist such a node, by convention we define r i (P ) = n. We suppress the dependence of r i (P ) on P whenever there is no ambiguity.
Remark 1: Given two allocation profiles P andP , which only differ in the ith coordinate, using (1) and the definition of radius, one can easily see that C i (P ) − C i (P ) = r i (P ) − r i (P ). This establishes an equivalence between decrease in cost and increase in radius for player i, when the actions of the remaining players are fixed.
In fact, using Remark 1, another useful way of thinking about CSR games is to consider a group of n selfish players who are connected via an unweighted, undirected graph. The action of each agent is to pick a color (resource) in O, and her utility is the distance from the closest agent with the same color. That is, each agent would like to be as far as possible from all agents with the same color, or equivalently, to maximize its radius.
Definition 3: Given a profile of allocations at time t by P (t) = (P 1 (t), . . . , P n (t)) on a graph with diameter D, we define a radius vector by n(t) = (n 1 (t), n 2 (t), . . . , n D (t)), where n r (t), r = 1, . . . , D is the number of agents who have radius r with respect to the profile P (t). Also, we let N r (t) be the set of all agents at time t whose radius is r, that is, |N r (t)| = n r (t).
It has been shown in [19] that the CSR game admits an ordinal potential function, and hence a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, in the following we introduce a potential function in a slightly different form, which will be more useful for our analysis.
Lemma 1: In the binary preference CSR game, assume that at time step t an agent i whose radius is r updates its resource based on the best response (i.e. minimizing its cost). Then there exists an integer α > 0 such that n(t + 1) has the following form:
In other words, the radius vector corresponding to the game will decrease lexicographically after each best response.
Proof: Let us assume that P i (t) = {a} and that player i wants to update its resource at time t to P i (t + 1) = {b} at the next time step in order to increase its radius (and hence decrease its cost). Moreover, let us assume i ∈ N r (t) for some r ∈ {1, . . . , D − 1}. After such update, player i will leave the set N r (t) in favor of another set N r (t + 1) at the next time step by increasing its radius to some r > r. In order to prove the lemma we will show that
To see this, let us consider another player j ∈ N k (t) for some arbitrary but fixed k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, i.e., the radius of player j at time t, denoted by r j (t) = k, is less than r. We consider three cases:
• P j (t) / ∈ {a, b}: In this case updating i does not affect the radius of player j, i.e., player j will remain in its own radius set at the next time step. Thus j ∈ N k (t+1).
• P j (t) = {a}: In this case since r j (t) = k < r, the radius of j is determined by another player except i. In particular, updating player i's resource from {a} to {b} does not affect the radius of player j, i.e., player j will remain in its own set j ∈ N k (t + 1).
• P j (t) = {b}: In this case, one can again see that r j (t)
is fully determined by a player other than i. Moreover, since after updating i from P i (t) = {a} to P i (t + 1) = {b}, agent i's radius will even increase further to r , we conclude that the graphical distance between j and i must be at least r . Since we already know r > r > k, this shows that updating i cannot affect the radius of j, i.e. j ∈ N k (t + 1).
Therefore, from the above cases we conclude that if the radius of an agent is less than r before updating agent i, then it will remain the same at the next time step, i.e.
Next we show that if the radius of an agent j is greater than r, i.e. j ∈ N s (t) for some s ≥ r, then after updating i, it cannot reduce to something less than or equal to r at the next time step. Again, we consider three cases:
• P j (t) / ∈ {a, b}: In this case updating i does not affect the radius of j and thus player j will remain in its own radius set at the next time step, i.e. j ∈ N s (t + 1).
• P j (t) = {a}: In this case and after updating i, the radius of j not only does not decrease but also it may increase, since there are fewer resources of type {a}.
• P j (t) = {b}: In this case the graphical distance between j and i must be at least r as otherwise, updating i from P i (t) = {a} to P i (t + 1) = {b} will not increase player i's radius to r . Therefore, updating i cannot reduce r j (t) to r or less.
Finally, we note that at least one player (player i) will leave the set N r (t) in favor of N r (t + 1) at the next time step. Therefore, n r (t + 1) will be at least one less than n r (t). These together show the relations in (2), which completes the proof. Using Lemma 1 one can obtain a naive upper bound for the convergence time of the best response dynamics to a NE. One can in fact note that since D r=1 n r (t) = n for all t, the maximum number of updating steps before any other best response move is possible by any player (i.e., reaching a pure-strategy NE) can be upper bounded by the number of non-negative integer solutions of
which is equal to
, where D is the diameter of the graph G. This shows that the best response dynamics converges reasonably fast to an NE over networks of small diameter. For example, as it has been pointed out in [11] and [24] , Erdos-Renyi random graphs with n vertices where each edge appears with probability p, have with high probability diameter at most 2 whenever p ≥ c ln n n for c > 2. In particular by taking p = 1 2 almost all such random graphs over n vertices have diameter at most 2. In addition, most of the real world social networks benefit from having a low diameter, a small-world phenomenon which states that most nodes can be reached from every other node by a small number of hops [25] . Therefore, the convergence speed of the best response dynamics for the CSR game over small-world social networks is fast. However, as we are interested in the worst-case scenario, our aim is to devise some distributed algorithms which converge fast over general networks and not only over networks of small diameter, which will be our focus in the remainder of this paper.
IV. LEAST BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
In this section we introduce a new updating rule for the players in order to obtain an NE more efficiently. In fact, a closer look into Lemma 1 shows that the speed of convergence of the best response dynamics is highly dependent on the radius of the updating agent at each time instant. To see this more clearly, defining a potential function
D−i and using Lemma 1 one can see that V (t) is a decreasing function over the iterations of the best response dynamics. In particular, the lower the radius of updating, the more decrease will be seen in the value of the function V (·). Since such a function is always nonnegative, the iterations of the best response dynamics must terminate by finding a valid pure-strategy NE. Based on this observation and in order to incorporate the role of updating radii into our algorithm we introduce a slightly different version of the best response dynamics as follows:
Least Best Response Algorithm: Given a CSR game, at each time t = 1, 2, . . ., and from all the players who want to update, we select a player with the least radius and let her update be based on her best response. Ties are broken arbitrarily.
As an immediate consequence of the least best response algorithm we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: Let |O| denote the number of resources in the CSR game. Then, in the least best response dynamics, we have r(t) ≤ |O| − 1, ∀t, where r(t) is the radius of the updating agent at time step t.
Proof: In order to reach a contradiction, suppose that there exists a time instant t such that r(t) ≥ |O|. Based on the least best response dynamics, this can happen if all the agents with radii smaller than r(t) are playing their best response. Now assume that an agent i with P i (t) = {a} has radius r(t) ≥ |O| and she wants to update its resource. We claim that all the players in the shortest path between i and the closest agent to her who has the same resource, i.e., j = σ i (P (t), P i (t)) must have different resources. Otherwise, if and are two players on this shortest path who have the same resource, then the radius of denoted by r (t) will be smaller than r(t). Since all the agents who have distance at most r (t) to will have distance smaller than r(t) to i, none of them can have {a} as their resource. This means that player can improve her radius by updating her resource to {a}, which is in contradiction with the fact that all the agents with radii smaller than r(t) are playing their best responses. Therefore, none of the agents on the shortest path between i and j (except i and j) and the node in which i wants to update to its resource can have the same resource. Since the total number of resources is |O|, we must have r(t) + 1 ≤ |O|.
Corollary 1: As a result of Lemmas 1 and 2 one can easily see that the least best response dynamics converge to an NE after no more than n |O|−1 steps. We now have another lemma which will be useful in the proof of our main result in this section.
Lemma 3: In the least best response dynamics, suppose that a player i ∈ N r (t) updates her resource from P i (t) = {a} to P i (t + 1) = {b} and thus increases her radius to r . If there exists a player ∈ ∪ r−1 j=1 N j (t) who is playing her best response at time t but has an incentive to deviate at time t+1 (i.e., after updating player i), then we must have |O| ≥ 5.
Proof: Let us assume that there exists such a player with ∈ N k (t) for some 1 ≤ k < r. Also, let be the nearest node to with the same resource, i.e. = σ (P (t), P (t)) and set P (t) = P (t) = {c} for some resource c. Note that in order for player i's deviation to affect player , she must be within a graphical distance of at most k from , i.e. d G (i, ) ≤ k. Furthermore, we must have d G (i, ) + k ≥ r , otherwise, would be able to deviate to {b} and increase her radius even before updating i (which is in contradiction with the updating rule in the least best response dynamics). Combining these relations together, we get k ≥ r 2 . Overall we have
Since k is an integer, we conclude that k ≥ 2.
Next we note that c / ∈ {a, b}. For if c = b, then there is no incentive for i to deviate from a to b. Also, if c = a, then r ≤ d G (i, ) which is in contradiction with (3). Moreover, since we know that agent was playing her best response before updating i, it means that all the resources have appeared at least once in B G ( , k). In addition, since updating i from {a} to {b} creates this incentive for to deviate, the only way for such deviation is that player evicts {c} from her cache and inserts {a}. But this will lead to an increase in her radius from k to something larger, in which case it is not hard to see that the minimum number of resources for realizing such a situation is to have d G (i, ) = k = 2, r = 3, r = 4 and with at least 5 different resources, as it has been shown in Figure 1 . Thus |O| ≥ 5 and this proves the Lemma. In the following theorem we have the result that when the number of resources is at most 4, the least best response dynamics converges to an NE in linear time. This improves the convergence speed of an earlier algorithm in [19] for the case of two resources by a factor of n 2 . Moreover, as we will see in Appendix I, there is a close relationship between proper coloring of graphs and the Nash equilibrium points of the CSR game. While a proper coloring of a graph with only 2 colors can be done efficiently, for 3 or more colors it is an NP-hard problem. This may lead to the question of whether finding an NE in the CSR game when the number of resources is more than 2 can be done efficiently or not. As a result of the following theorem we will see that finding an NE in the CSR game with more than 2 resources can still be done efficiently.
Theorem 1: In the CSR game with n players and |O| ≤ 4, the least best response dynamics will converge to a purestrategy NE in no longer than 3n steps.
Proof: Let us assume that at time t an agent i ∈ N r (t) updates its resource from P i (t) = {a} to P i (t + 1) = {b} and therefore moves to N r (t+1) for some r > r. Based on the least best response, i is one of unsatisfied agents at time t who has the least radius, which means that all the players in ∪ r−1 k=1 N r (t) are playing their best response with respect to P (t). We claim that after player i's update, all the players in ∪ r−1 k=1 N r (t) will still play their best response with respect to P (t + 1).
To show that, let us assume that ∈ ∪ r−1 k=1 N r (t), i.e. there exists k < r such that ∈ N k (t) = N k (t + 1), where the equality is due to (2) in Lemma 1. Now after updating i from P i (t) = {a} to P i (t + 1) = {b}, the only reason why player would not be playing her best response in P (t + 1) anymore is that one of the following two cases occurs:
• Case I: P (t + 1) = {b} and after updating i from {a} to {b}, player thinks that either her radius has been decreased or she can increase it by allocating some other resource.
• Case II (bad case): wants to deviate from her current state (P (t + 1)) to {a} because she thinks that after updating i from {a} to {b} she might be able to increase her radius from k to something larger by allocating {a}. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 2 . We first show that Case I cannot happen. To see this, we note that d G ( , i) > k, as otherwise, after updating i to resource {b} her radius would be less than or equal to d G ( , i), which is less than r. This is in contradiction with the fact that agent i's radius will increase after her update. Now we know that there are fewer resources of type {b} in profile P (t) than in P (t + 1). Since agent 's best response was to choose {b} in P (t) with corresponding radius k and d G ( , i) > k, her best response will be the same as before at the next time step, i.e. P (t + 1) = {b}. This shows that Case I cannot happen. Finally, using Lemma 3, and since we have assumed |O| ≤ 4, one can see that Case II cannot happen either.
Therefore, we have shown that under the least best response dynamics if at some time t the minimum updating radius is r(t), then all the agents who have radii less than r(t) will still play their best responses. Moreover, using Lemma 1, one can see that when the radius of updating at time t is r(t), after at most n r(t) (t) steps the radius of updating will increase by at least 1 (because all the agents with radii less than r(t) will stay with their best responses, and they will not move away from their own radius sets). Since by Lemma 2 r(t) can be at most min{|O| − 1, D} ≤ 3, and n r (t) ≤ n for all t, we conclude that after at most 3n steps the dynamics will reach an NE.
It is worth noting that the only reason why the result of Theorem 1 may not extend to |O| ≥ 5 is that case II (bad case) may occur. Indeed, if we knew that the number of occurrences of bad cases is bounded from above by B, then one could show that the least best response dynamics will converge to an equilibrium in O(B|O|n) time steps.
The following theorem now says that the least best response dynamics converges fast on relatively dense graphs.
Theorem 2: In the CSR game with n agents and with d min ≥ |O|, the least best response dynamics will converge to an NE in no longer than n 3 min{|O| − 1, D} steps, where d min denotes the minimum degree of the graph.
Proof: We show that if d min ≥ |O|, then the number of bad cases (Case II) that can happen during the executions of the least best response dynamics is at most n 2 . Also, as in the case of Theorem 1 we argue that since the gap between any two consecutive occurrences of bad cases can be at most n min{|O| − 1, D}, the overall the dynamics will terminate at an NE in no longer than n 2 × n min{|O| − 1, D} = n 3 min{|O| − 1, D} steps. To show this, using Lemma 1 the number of bad updates with r(t) = 2 cannot be greater than n 2 . Except that, all the other updates will have radii greater than or equal to 3. It then remains to show that when r(t) ≥ 3 for some t, this update cannot be a bad update. In fact when d min ≥ |O|, by the pigeon hole principle at least two of the neighbors of player , say j and j , will have the same resources and hence their radii will be at most 2. Therefore, j can increase her radius by updating to {a}. But we know that the updating radius at time t is r(t) ≥ 3 while j is an agent with a smaller radius who wants to deviate. This is in contradiction with the updating rule of the least best response dynamics. Therefore after at most n 2 windows of time, each of length at most n min{|O| − 1, D}, which may possibly include some bad cases, no other bad case can happen and the dynamics will terminate at an NE.
In fact, using similar arguments one can slightly generalize the result of Theorem 2 to the case where
, and obtain a polynomial time algorithm for finding an NE using the least best response dynamics. We only state this result in the following corollary:
Corollary 2: The least best response dynamics converges to an NE in polynomial time provided that |O| dmin = O(1). According to Theorems 1 and 2, the least best response algorithm can provide polynomial time search for finding an NE in the CSR game when the number of resources is limited or when the underlying network is dense with respect to the number of resources; however, in general networks, the number of best responses to reach an equilibrium can be exponentially large O(n D ). To address this issue, in the next sections, we used some boosting technique to provide a quasi-polynomial time approximation algorithm for the Nash equilibrium points of the CSR game without any assumption on the structure of the network or the number of resources.
V. APPROXIMATION ALGORITHM FOR THE NASH EGUILIBRIUM IN THE CSR GAME
In this section, we devise a quasi-polynomial approximation algorithm in order to obtain an allocation profile such that the cost of each players lies within a constant factor of that in an NE over general networks. In particular, we will see that such approximation algorithm runs in polynomial time when there is some uniformity or symmetry in the network.
In fact, it is not hard to see that for a given NE profile P * of the CSR game, each player i is able to see all the possible resources within a graphical ball around her with a radius equal to r i (P * ). Therefore, in an NE profile, one would expect to see a "well-distributed" set of resources around each player. This observation suggests that in order to find an equilibrium one could devise an algorithm such that its evolution decreases the extra repetition of various resources around each player. Using this observation we introduce the following dynamics which aim to reduce the redundancy of similar resources (colors) around each player.
-Coloring Dynamics: Given a network G, a real number > 1, a set of nonnegative integers {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n }, and an arbitrary initial allocation profile P (0), at every time instance we select an agent i whose ball B G (i, r i ) contains at least two nodes with similar resources (colors), and we let any one of them (if possible) to update its resource to another one which did not appear in B G (i, (2 + 1)r i ). Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Lemma 4: The -coloring dynamics terminates after no more than O n 2 |O| rmax rmin log n steps, where r max = max{r k : r k > 0} and r min = min{r k : r k > 0}. Moreover, in the final profile and for any player i, either all the resources appear at least once in B G (i, (2 +1)r i ), or every two players in B G (i, r i ) have different resources.
Proof: First, let us assume that the algorithm terminates with a profile P . For any arbitrary but fixed node i, if all the resources are different in B G (i, r i ), then the statement of the lemma holds. Otherwise, there are at least two nodes in B G (i, r i ), namely j, j , that have the same color ( Figure  3 (2 + 1)r i ) . Therefore, if at least one resource, namely o 2 , is missing in B G (i, (2 + 1)r i ), then node j can play a strictly better response by updating its current resource P j to o 2 . But, we assumed that P is the final profile of the algorithm, meaning that neither j nor j want to deviate. This contradiction shows that if there are at least two nodes with similar resources in B G (i, r i ), then all the resources must appear at least once in B G (i, (2 + 1)r i ).
Next, we show that such dynamics terminate after no more than O n 2 |O| rmax rmin log n updates. To see this, let m i (t) denote the number of different resources in B G (i, r i ) at time step t, and define a potential function M (t) to be
Note that M (·) is a nonnegative function which is upper bounded by M (t) ≤ k:r k >0 |O| (r k ) log n ≤ n |O| (rmin) log n for all t. We will show that after each time of running the dynamics, the value of the potential function given in (4) increases by at least 1 n(rmax) log n . To see this, let us assume that two nodes j, j ∈ B G (i, r i ) have the same resources at time step t, i.e., P j (t) = P j (t) = {o 1 }, and in the next time step based on the dynamics, one of them, let us say node j, updates its resource from o 1 to o 2 which did not exist in B G (i, (2 + 1)r i ) at time step t. Moreover, let
In other words, S(t) is the set of all agents at time step t, which has agent j and at least one other agent with resource o 2 in their balls. We note that for any agent k ∈ S(t), we must have r k > r i . This is due to the fact that every agent with color o 2 is outside of B G (i, (2 +1)r i ). Therefore, since d G (i, j) ≤ r i , the graphical distance between j and every other agent with resource o 2 is at least 2 r i . Now since for every k ∈ S(t), the ball B G (k, r k ) contains both j and another resource of color o 2 whose distance to node j is at least 2 r i , r k must be at least r i such that B G (k, r k ) covers both j and one other resource of type o 2 . Such a scenario has been illustrated in Figure 3 . Fig. 3 . Illustration of different nodes in the Lemma 4. Note that in this figure it is assumed that node j updates its resource at time t + 1 from
On the other hand, for any agent k ∈ [n] \ S(t), and after updating node j from color o 1 to o 2 at time step t + 1, the value m k (t) is nondecreasing, i.e., m k (t) ≤ m k (t + 1), ∀k ∈ [n] \ S(t). This is because at time step t the ball B G (k, r k ) either does not contain a resource of type o 2 or does not contain the node j. Putting all this together, at time t + 1, we have
Now we can write
where in the second last inequality we have used |S(t)| ≤ n−1, since at least i / ∈ S(t). Therefore, M (·) cannot increase more that n 2 |O| rmax rmin log n times, which shows that the running time is at most O n 2 |O| rmax rmin log n . Next we consider the following useful definition: Definition 4: Given an undirected network G, and an arbitrary node i, we let τ i ∈ N be such that
i.e., τ i is the smallest positive integer such that a graphical ball of radius τ i around node i contains at least |O| nodes.
Note that by the above definition τ i is a fixed number that can be computed for each agent a priori and does not change as the allocation profile changes. Next, in the following theorem, we provide an algorithm for approximating any NE of the CSR within a constant factor in only quasi-polynomial time. 2 +1 we get that at the end of the Stage 1 and for any arbitrary agent k, either all the resources appear at least once in B G (k, τ k − 1), or every two nodes in B G (k,
But by definition of τ k , all the resources cannot appear in B G (k, τ k − 1), which means that the second case must happen, i.e., at the termination of the stage 1 and for any k ∈ [n], all the resources in B G (k,
2 +1 ) are different. Now denoting the profile obtained at the end of Stage 1 by P , we start the second stage by setting P (0) = P , and
. Similarly, using the result of Lemma 4, at the end of Stage 2 and for any arbitrary agent k, either all the resources appear at least once in B G (k, (2 + 1)(τ k + 1)), or every two nodes in B G (k, τ k +1) have different resources. But by the definition of τ k , all the resources in B G (k, τ k +1) cannot be different. Therefore, for each k the first case must happen, i.e., at the termination of the algorithm and for any k ∈ [n], all the resources must appear at least once in B G (k, (2 + 1)(τ k + 1)). Moreover, using Lemma 4 one can easily see that the total running time of both Stages 1 and 2 is at most O n 2 |O| τmax τmin log n . Next we argue that the property of having different colors in
2 +1 -neighborhood of any agent k which is inherited at the end of stage 1, will not be affected during the execution of the second stage. We show it by induction on the iteration steps t = 0, 1, . . . of the second stage. For the initial profile of the second stage (P ) which is set to be the final profile of the first stage, this property clearly holds. Now given that at the tth iteration of the second stage B G (k,
contains different resources, let us assume that at time t + 1 a node j which has the same resource as j ∈ B G (i, τ i + 1) for some i updates its resource from P j (t) to another resource o 2 which does not exist in B G (i, (2 + 1)(τ i + 1)). We claim that updating j from P j (t) to P j (t + 1) = o 2 does not create any pair of nodes of the same resource in any of the balls B G (k,
. Otherwise, if it creates a pair of resources o 2 in some ball B G (k 0 ,
, then that ball must contain both j and another resource o 2 , which is at least 2 (τ i + 1) hops away from j. Therefore,
. Since by definition of τ i we know that B G (i, τ i + 1) must contain at least |O| vertices, B G (k 0 , τ k0 − 1) also contains at least |O| vertices. But this is in contradiction with the definition of τ k0 . Therefore, in step t + 1 no pair of vertices with the same resource will be created in B G (k,
, which completes the induction process.
Since we have shown that for any agent k, the final profile at the termination of Algorithm, i.e.,P , has this property that all the vertices in B G (k,
2 +1 ) have different resources, while all the resources appear at least once in B G (k, (2 + 1)(τ k + 1)). Thus we can write
On the other hand, for any allocation profile, and in particular for an NE P * we always have
where the inequality holds since node k has to pay at least
2 +1 )| closest resources, and to pay at least τ k +1 2 +1 for the remaining resources. Comparing the above two relations, one can easily see that for all k ∈ [n], we have C k (P ) ≤ (2 + 1)
2 C k (P * ). Corollary 3: The worst case running time of the allocation algorithm given in Theorem 3 is at most O |O|n 2+ln D .
Proof: Set = exp(1). Since τ min is the minimum over the set of all positive integers, τ min ≥ 1. Moreover, by definition we always have τ max ≤ D. The result then follows by substituting these relations into the statement of Theorem 3.
In fact, a closer look at the result of Theorem 3 shows that when the network is symmetric, then τ max = τ min , and hence, the running time of the algorithm shrinks to only O(n 2 |O|). The same situation happens when the distribution of nodes in the network is somehow uniform, meaning that every node in the network observes almost the same number (up to a global constant factor) of nodes in different hops from him, i.e., τmax τmin = O(1). As some examples of uniform networks one can consider:
• Grids (lattice): A graph with vertices in Z k such that each node is adjacent to those whose Euclidean distanced is 1 from it, • Hypercube: A k dimensional hypercube is a graph with vertex set {0, 1} k such that two k-tuples are adjacent if and only if they differ in exactly one position, • Erdos-Renyi graphs, and many other uniform structures, in which case the running time of the above approximation algorithm will be polynomial.
VI. CSR GAME WITH DIFFERENT CAPACITIES Heretofore we have assumed that the capacity of each agent is exactly 1. In the following we generalize our results when this capacity is allowed to be more than 1, and possibly different for different agents. To be more precise, let us assume that agent i's capacity is L i ∈ N where 1 ≤ L i ≤ |O|. Similarly, for a particular allocation profile P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ), with |P i | = L i , i ∈ [n], we define the sum cost function of the ith player C i (P ) as before by:
where σ i (P, o) is i s nearest node holding o in P . We next show that as before the resulting game is an ordinal potential game and that one can find a pure-strategy NE of the game in polynomial time when the number of resources is limited.
Theorem 4: The CSR game with different capacities is an ordinal potential game. Moreover, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to find a pure-strategy NE of the CSR game with different capacities whenever |O| ≤ L min d min , where L min denotes the minimum cache size of all the players, i.e.,
Proof: Let us replace each agent i with capacity L i with L i new nodes each with capacity 1 which are forming a clique. Moreover, we treat all of these L i clique nodes as node i and very naturally we connect them to all the other nodes where i was connected before. Figure 4 depicts such a scenario. Now, if an agent i with P i (t) = {o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o k } wants to update to P i (t + 1) = {o i1 , o i2 , . . . , o i k } based on her better response in the original game, then we must have
This shows that there exists at least one agent j * such that
. In other words, if agent i wants to deviate in the original game, there is at least one resource o j * in her cache such that by evicting this resource and inserting o j * she can increase her payoff. This means that at least one of the new nodes representing i in the unit cache size game wants to deviate. Moreover, since in the unit cache size game all the agents within a clique are connected with each other, no two of such agents will allocate the same resources. Therefore, if we find an NE for the unit cache size game and we stack all the resources corresponding to clique i as the cache content of player i in the original game, we obtain an allocation profile such that |P i | = L i , ∀i such that no player has any incentive to deviate, i.e., an NE allocation for the original game.
Therefore, we only need to find an NE for the unit cache size game, in which case applying the least best response dynamics on the new network with unit cache size will result in an NE. Hence, all the previous results can be carried over to the new network. The only difference is that instead of n players we will now have L = n i=1 L i players. Also, note that the minimum degree in the new graph will be at least d min L min . Thus substituting L for n and d min L min for d min in Theorems 1 and 2 will give us a polynomial time algorithm O(L 3 min{D, |O|−1}) to construct an NE in the game with different capacities, provided that |O| ≤ L min d min . By a closer look at the proof of Theorem 4, one can see that in order to find an NE efficiently for the CSR game with different capacities we would only require that the least best response dynamics converges efficiently on the equivalent CSR game with unit cache size. On the other hand, by Theorem 2 a sufficient condition for polynomial time convergence of the least best response dynamics in the CSR game with unit cache size is to have d min ≥ |O|. This suggests that if we could increase the capacity of the nodes properly (which in turn will increase the minimum degree of nodes in the equivalent CSR game with unit cache size), then we would have a polynomial time algorithm for finding an NE in the game with higher capacities.
Based on the above observation, as a network designer we can ask the following question: Given a network G, what are the best nodes one can select so that by increasing their capacities one can guarantee that the least best response dynamics converges in polynomial time to an NE of the CSR game with higher capacities? In other words, it would be very worthy if increasing cache sizes of a few nodes in the network can guarantee an efficient algorithm for finding an NE. Therefore, in the following we formulate this problem as an integer programming problem. Relaxing this integer program to a linear program and rounding off real-valued solutions to the upper integer values, we find an almost tight expression for the minimum extra capacities and their corresponding locations in the network for fast convergence to an NE in the CSR with higher capacities.
Let us denote the capacity of node i by a variable x i where x i ∈ N, and let x be the column vector (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) . As discussed in the proof of Theorem 4, by expanding the network and replacing node i with x i identical nodes each of unit capacity, the degree of each of these new nodes would be j∈N (i) x j , where N (i) is the set of neighbors of node i in G. Moreover, by Theorem 2 a sufficient for fast convergence of the least best response dynamics to an Nash equilibrium is to have
Rewriting all the inequalities in (6) in a matrix form, we get A G x ≥ |O|1 where A G is the adjacency matrix of G and the inequality is entrywise. Since we would like to assign the minimum number of capacities to the agents, we end up with the following integer program:
In the above formulation, the capacities of the agents are restricted to be integer valued. However, we can relax the integer program (7) by assuming x i ∈ [1, ∞). Substituting y = x − 1 in the relaxed version of (7), we arrive at the following linear program:
where
is the column vector of the degrees of the graph G. In fact, the entries of y denote the extra capacity needed to be added to each node in the network. Given a solution y * of (8), let y * be a vector which is obtained by rounding off the entries of y * to the closest integers greater than or equal to them. Note that since all the entries of A are non-negative, y * is a feasible solution for (8) and hence we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Consider an arbitrary network G of n nodes with adjacency matrix A G and a corresponding degree vector d. Then, the least best response dynamics will converge to an equilibrium of the CSR game in polynomial time O(n 3 |O| 4 ) by adding y * i extra cache for agent i, where y * i is a solution of the linear program (8) .
Proof: The proof simply follows from the discussion preceding the theorem. Since the maximum cache size for each agent is |O| we get L ≤ n|O|. Hence using Theorems 2 and 4 we can find an NE in no more than (n|O|) 3 min{D, |O| − 1} = O(n 3 |O| 4 ) steps.
A. A Numerical Example
In the following, we provide some numerical results of locating effective nodes in the network and adding extra capacities such that the least best response dynamics have faster convergence to an equilibrium. In Figure I we have shown four different networks G 1 , G 2 , G 3 and G 4 in an increasing order of edge density. We consider the CSR game on these networks with |O| = 5 resources. In order to accelerate convergence to an equilibrium in each of these networks, we solve the linear program (8) for each of them and find the extra capacity y i needed for each agent i. The numerical results are given in Table II . Each column of the table corresponds to a different network and each pair (y * i , y * i ) denotes the optimal extra capacity and the uprounded integer extra capacity for agent i. Also, the last two rows of Table II are related to the largest eigenvalue of each network (which is a measure of edge density) and the total extra capacity needed, normalized by the number of agents in the network. It can be seen that as long as the densities of the networks are allowed to increase, the need for extra cache will tend to zero. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied a capacitated resource allocation game with binary preferences. Using an ordinal potential function we have introduced a class of dynamics, namely the least best response dynamics. We have shown that these dynamics will drive to an NE in no longer than n min{|O| − 1, D} steps when the number of resources is bounded by 5, and in no longer than n 3 min{|O| − 1, D} steps when the underlying graph is relatively dense, i.e. d min ≥ |O|. Moreover, we have provided an algorithm to approximate an NE of the CSR game over general networks. We have generalized our results to CSR games with different capacities and showed that by increasing the capacity of the agents one can obtain an NE even faster. In particular, we have determined the location of effective nodes and the extra cache size by solving a linear program.
As an interesting future research direction one can study the complexity of finding an NE for the CSR game over general networks. Moreover, in order to find an equilibrium in the CSR game, one can increase the cache sizes and recover an equilibrium very fast using the least best response dynamics. Therefore, one natural question is the relationship of this equilibrium to that of the unit size cache CSR game. For example, one may be able to construct an equilibrium for the unit size cache CSR game using an equilibrium of a CSR game with slightly higher capacities and use some selection rules in order to assign only one unit resource to each player. Also studying the dynamic version of the CSR game, as what has been discussed in [26] and [27] , would be an interesting extension.
